Wujick v Dale & Dale by unknown
1995 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
1-6-1995 
Wujick v Dale & Dale 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995 
Recommended Citation 
"Wujick v Dale & Dale" (1995). 1995 Decisions. 5. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/5 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1995 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
  
            
 
 No. 93-1853 
                                      
 
 
 PHYLLIS WUJICK and JOSEPH MATISKA, 
  
        Appellees 
 
 v. 
 
 DALE & DALE, INC., DALE & DALE DESIGN & DEVELOPMENT, INC., 
t/d/b/a DALE & DALE HOMES, ATLANTIC FINANCIAL a/k/a 
ATLANTIC FINANCIAL FEDERAL, ESTATE OF FINANCIAL FEDERAL R.T.C., 
 
       
 Defendants, 
 
 RESOLUTION TRUST CORP., 
 in its capacity as Receiver for 
 Atlantic Financial Federal, 
 
        Appellant 
            
   
 Appeal from the 
 United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 93-1939). 
 
 
             
 
 Argued March 8, 1994 
            
 
 BEFORE: MANSMANN, LEWIS and SEITZ, Circuit Judges. 
 
 (Filed: October 13, 1994) 
            
 
William R. Thompson, Esquire 
Robert C. Seiger, Jr., Esquire 
Richard M. Beck, Esquire (Argued) 
Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Ellrs 
  
1401 Walnut Street 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102 
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
  
David P. Tomaszewski, Esquire (Argued) 
Kimberly D. Borland, Esquire       
Borland and Borland 
1100 PNC Bank Building 
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania 18701 
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEES 
 
 ____________________ 
 
 OPINION OF THE COURT 
            
 
SEITZ, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
 One of the defendants, Resolution Trust Corporation, in 
its capacity as Receiver for Atlantic Financial Federal, appeals 
an order of the district court remanding this action to the Court 
of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, Pennsylvania.  The issues 
before us are whether the district court had subject matter 
jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l) (Supp. V 1993), which 
grants both jurisdiction to the federal courts and removal power 
to RTC.  This Court has jurisdiction under 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)-
(3)(C) (Supp. V 1993), which empowers RTC to "appeal any order of 
remand entered by a United States district court." 
 I. FACTS 
  On January 11, 1990, the Office of Thrift Supervision, 
Department of the Treasury of the United States, appointed the 
Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) as Receiver for the defendant, 
Atlantic Financial Federal ("Old Atlantic"), a savings and loan 
association.  After accepting the appointment, RTC created a new 
federal savings association, Atlantic Financial Savings, F.A. 
("New Atlantic"), pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 
  
1993), to assume such assets of the failed institution as RTC-
Receiver might deem appropriate.  The Office of Thrift 
Supervision then appointed RTC as Conservator of New Atlantic.  
RTC-Receiver of Old Atlantic and New Atlantic executed a Purchase 
and Assumption Agreement, whereby New Atlantic purchased 
substantially all of the assets of Old Atlantic.  Unsecured 
obligations to general creditors, however, remained with Old 
Atlantic.   
 Sometime prior to the takeover of Old Atlantic by 
Resolution Trust, the plaintiffs in this action had contracted 
with defendant Dale and Dale ("Dale & Dale") to build a home for 
them in Pennsylvania.  Old Atlantic had financed the 
construction.  Plaintiffs became dissatisfied with the 
construction and Old Atlantic's handling of the loan proceeds.  
Thereafter, the plaintiffs commenced this action in the Luzerne 
County Court of Common Pleas against Dale & Dale and, inter alia, 
RTC.  They did so by filing a praecipe for a writ of Summons 
("Writ") with that court on April 12, 1990.  
 On April 16, 1990, the Luzerne County sheriff served the 
Writ at Atlantic Financial offices in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania.  
The Writ named RTC as a defendant.1  On that date the Wilkes-
Barre offices were owned and operated by RTC as Conservator for 
                     
1
.  Plaintiffs-appellees designated this defendant as "Atlantic 
Financial, a/k/a Atlantic Financial Federal; Estate of Financial 
Federal R.T.C."  RTC-Receiver substituted itself as a defendant 
in its later notice of removal. 
  
New Atlantic, not RTC as Receiver for Old Atlantic.  The Writ was 
served without a complaint or any other indication of the 
subject-matter of the action.  It merely recited that "the 
plaintiff(s) have commenced an action in law against you."   The 
procedure was consistent with Pennsylvania practice.2 
 Plaintiffs contend that on April 16, 1990, four days after 
they commenced the action in the Luzerne County court by filing 
the praecipe, they filed the statutorily required administrative 
claim with the RTC.  They argue that RTC "ignored" the 
administrative claim.  There is no documentary evidence of such a 
claim in the record.  However, during oral argument, RTC's 
counsel stated that although it had no record of the claim, it 
conceded that the administrative claim was "constructively 
denied" because of RTC's inaction.  Without understanding the 
logic of RTC's concession, we shall treat it as a judicial 
admission that plaintiffs filed such a claim.  However, RTC did 
not concede that any such claim for administrative relief was 
timely filed. 
                     
2
.  The Pennsylvania rule provides: 
 Rule 1007.   Commencement of Action 
  An action may be commenced by filing with 
the prothonotary 
  (1) a precipe for a writ of summons, 
 
  (2) a complaint, or 
 
  . . . . 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 1007 (1987). 
  
 No further pertinent action appears to have taken place 
until January 19, 1993, when the plaintiffs filed a complaint in 
the Luzerne County action.  On March 23, 1993, it was served on 
RTC-Receiver in Norristown, Pennsylvania.  RTC then removed the 
case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania on April 12, 1993.  Based on 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) 
(Supp. V 1993),3 plaintiffs made a timely motion for remand to 
the state court which was granted.  RTC now appeals that order 
which has been stayed.  
 
 II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
 The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and 
Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") confers original subject 
matter jurisdiction on United States district courts to hear 
cases involving RTC. 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(1).4  Section 
                     
3
.  As the Fifth Circuit has pointed out: "FIRREA imposes no time 
limit on motions to remand.  In the absence of specific contrary 
provisions, we look to the general removal statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1447(c) . . . ." Resolution Trust Corp. v. Sonny's Old Land 
Corp., 937 F.2d 128, 131 (5th Cir. 1991). 
4
.  FIRREA provides: 
 (l) Power to Remove; jurisdiction 
  (1) In general 
     Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, 
any civil action, suit, or proceeding to which the 
Corporation is a party shall be deemed to arise 
under the laws of the United States, and the 
district courts shall have original jurisdiction 
over such action, suit, or proceeding. 
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(1) (Supp. V 1993). 
  
1441a(l)(3) of the Act permits RTC to remove any suits, to which 
it is a party, to the district court within certain time frames.5   
In the present case, the district court concluded that RTC had 
not timely removed the state action.  RTC argues that the state 
action was timely removed because 1) the April 16, 1990 service 
was improper and 2) a Writ is not a document which initiates the 
thirty-day removal provision.   
 Compliance with the procedures for removal, e.g. 
timeliness of removal, are procedural issues to be distinguished 
from subject matter jurisdiction in the district court. See 
Medlin v. Boeing Vertol Co., 620 F.2d 957, 960 (3d Cir. 1980); 
see also Spring Garden Assoc., L.P. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 26 
F.3d 412, 415 (3d Cir. 1994); In re Digicon Marine, Inc., 966 
                     
5
.  The section reads: 
 (l) Power to Remove; jurisdiction (3) 
Removal and remand 
  
    (A) In general 
    . . . . 
 
    The removal of any such suit or 
proceeding shall be instituted 
 
   (i)   not later than 90 days after the 
date the Corporation is substituted as a 
party, or 
   (ii)  not later than 30 days after 
service on the Corporation, if the 
Corporation is named as a party in any 
capacity and if such suit is filed after 
August 9, 1989. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1441a(l)(3) (Supp. V 1993). 
  
F.2d 158, 160 (5th Cir 1992); Nolan v. Boeing Co., 919 F.2d 1058, 
1063 n.6 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The time limitation for removal is not 
jurisdictional; it is merely `modal and formal and may be 
waived.'"). 
 This Court has stated, "[E]very federal appellate court 
has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only of its own 
jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under 
review." Spring Garden, 26 F.3d at 415 (quoting Employers Ins. of 
Wausau v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 905 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
Therefore, we shall put aside addressing the procedural problems 
presented by the parties and address directly the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the district court with respect to RTC.  This 
Court exercises plenary review in determining whether the lower 
courts had subject matter jurisdiction. National Union Fire Ins. 
Co. v. City Savings, F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 383 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
 Since our Court has an independent obligation to determine 
the subject matter jurisdiction of the district court, we proceed 
to that task.  Although the district court did not address the 
issue of its subject matter jurisdiction, we conclude that the 
ends of judicial economy dictate that we resolve this legal issue 
because the facts relevant to its disposition are not in dispute. 
 Plaintiffs commenced their suit in state court by filing a 
praecipe for a writ of summons on April 12, 1990.  However, they 
  
did not file their administrative claim with RTC until April 16, 
1990, some four days after the filing of this suit in state 
court.  The critical question is whether the state action is 
jurisdictionally infirm under FIRREA because it was filed by the 
plaintiffs against RTC, etc., prior to exhaustion of their 
administrative remedies.  We turn now to the pertinent provisions 
of FIRREA. 
 FIRREA has created a comprehensive administrative 
procedure for adjudicating claims against a failed depository 
institution.  RTC as Receiver initiates the administrative 
process by notifying the failed institution's creditors to 
present their claims to RTC Receiver. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821(d)(3)(B)(i) (Supp. V 1993).  Once a creditor timely 
presents its claim, the RTC-Receiver has 180 days to consider the 
claim and determine whether it will be allowed or disallowed, and 
to notify the claimant of its disposition. 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1821(d)(5)(A)(i) (Supp. V 1993).  
 Section 1821(d)(6)(A) provides for judicial review only 
for suits brought within sixty days after the claim has been 
disallowed by the RTC-Receiver or the 180-day statutory period 
has expired without action on the claim by the Receiver.  The 
statute provides: 
 (D)  Limitation on judicial review 
   Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, 
no      court shall have jurisdiction over 
    (i)  any claim or action for payment from, or 
any action seeking a determination of rights 
with respect to, the assets of any depository 
institution for which the Corporation has been 
  
appointed receiver, including assets which the 
Corporation may acquire from itself as such 
receiver . . . .  
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) (Supp. V 1993).6  This Court has very 
recently stated: 
 [W]e have characterized the jurisdictional restric-
tion in § 1821(d)(13)(D) as a statutory exhaustion 
requirement: in order to obtain jurisdiction to 
bring a claim in federal court, one must exhaust 
administrative remedies by submitting the claim to 
the receiver in accordance with the administrative 
scheme for adjudicating claims detailed in 
§ 1821(d). 
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 28 F.3d at 383 (citing Rosa v. 
Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 391 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 (1991)) (footnote omitted).  Therefore, a 
court would lack subject matter jurisdiction unless the 
administrative procedures set out in FIRREA were exhausted. See 
id.; Althouse v. Resolution Trust Corp., 969 F.2d 1544, 1545-46 
(3d Cir. 1992); Praxis Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, 
S.L.A., 947 F.2d 49, 63 (3d Cir. 1991); FDIC v. Shain, Schaffer & 
Rafanello, 944 F.2d 129, 132 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 At the time plaintiffs filed the praecipe with the Luzerne 
County, Pennsylvania court seeking a Writ, no court had subject 
matter jurisdiction over the suit because plaintiffs had failed 
to exhaust the administrative remedies mandated by section 
1821(d)(13)(D) of FIRREA.  In their later letter brief to this 
                     
6
.  The provisions of 12 U.S.C. § 1821 are made applicable to RTC 
by 12 U.S.C. § 1441a(b)(4)(A). 
  
Court, as well as in the briefs originally filed in this Court, 
plaintiffs argue a "no-harm, no-foul" rule.  They contend that 
"the end result would be the same whether the Plaintiff waited to 
file the Writ of Summons after the one hundred and eighty (180) 
day period." Letter Brief of Appellee at 3, Wujick v. Dale & 
Dale, Inc., et. al., No. 93-1939 (Feb. 25, 1994).  Plaintiffs' 
argument is incompatible with controlling law.   
 As this Court has stated, "Congress expressly withdrew 
jurisdiction from all courts over any claim to a failed bank's 
assets made outside the procedures set forth in section 1821."  
Shain, Schaffer & Rafanello, 944 F.2d at 132.  In addition, the 
United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the exhaustion 
provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, firmly rejected the "no 
harm, no foul" reasoning and held that where Congress has imposed 
an administrative exhaustion requirement by statute, the 
exhaustion of those procedures is mandatory. See McNeil v. United 
States, 113 S. Ct. 1980 (1993). 
 Finally, plaintiffs say that RTC never responded to their 
administrative claim once it was filed on April 16, 1990.  Under 
the statutory scheme, however, that argument is irrelevant 
because their administrative claim was initiated after their 
state action was commenced in 1990.  Since plaintiffs did not 
timely exhaust their administrative claim, the district court 
lacked subject matter jurisdiction of the action.  Since the 
state court also lacked subject matter jurisdiction for the same 
  
reason, a remand by the district court would be a vacuous act.  
We will therefore direct the district court to dismiss the claims 
against RTC.  
 
 III.  OTHER CLAIMS 
 Plaintiffs' state court complaint named certain other 
defendants, e.g., Dale & Dale.  On the present record, we are not 
in a position to dispose of the claims against the other 
defendants.  Consequently, we will, therefore, remand the case as 
to such claims to afford those parties an opportunity to present 
their positions to the district court for appropriate 
disposition. 
 
 IV.  CONCLUSION 
 The order of the district court remanding this action 
against RTC to the state court will be reversed with a direction 
to dismiss the claim against it. 
 So much of the order of the district court as remands the 
claims against the defendants other than RTC will be vacated and 
the claims remanded to the district court for appropriate 
disposition. 
 
 
         
